




Inter-regional redistribution in Sweden:  

















The Swedish system for inter-regional redistribution is examined from a political 
economy perspective and a growth perspective. A number of recent Swedish studies of 
this system are examined. Political economy concerns are found to be adequately 
represented in academic studies of this system, while lacking, at least explicitly, in all 
the major relevant government reports. Growth implications of extensive inter-
regional redistribution  are found to be relatively neglected in both academic studies 
and government reports. In particular, the short-circuiting of labour mobility (and 
hence the impairment of long-term structural adjustment) is examined at both micro- 
and macroeconomic levels. It is concluded that extensive inter-regional redistribution 
is likely to have considerable effects on labour mobility. The author argues that this 
almost entirely overlooked effect is an important consideration in evaluating the costs 
and benefits of inter-regional redistribution, and calls for further enquiry into the 
matter.  
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The normative principle of subsidiarity, according to which power originates at the 
local level and is delegated ’upwards’ to a central authority,  has been of key 
importance for European integration.
1 In Sweden, where a large share of the public 
sector is organized at county and municipal levels, the principle of local self-
government, including the power to tax, was explicitly recognized in the municipal 
reform of 1862, and incorporated in the constitution in 1975. The systems for fiscal 
decentralization in Sweden and the other Nordic countries (not counting Iceland) are 
unique regarding the scale and scope of the public sector at the local level, amounting 
to almost 70 percent of public spending. This is in part a consequence of counties and 
municipalities having been assigned a number of responsibilities that in most countries 
are managed at the national level. These responsibilities, mainly within the areas of 
healthcare, schools and community services, constitute the majority of fiscal 
expenditures at the county and municipal levels.   
For Swedish municipalities, self-government includes the power to tax and the 
right to influence, within limits, the allocation of the resulting tax revenue.
2 A large 
public sector at the local level is associated with difficulties caused by the mobility of 
the tax base. There are large differences between the per capita tax bases of different 
municipalities in Sweden. There are also large differences in costs faced by 
municipalities for the provision of goods and services, due to structural differences 
generated by demographic or geographic factors. To be able to maintain a public 
sector standard in line with the rest of the country, some municipalities, if relying 
entirely on their own tax base, would be forced to set tax rates at prohibitively high 
levels. This, in turn, would encourage the relocation of the mobile tax base, 
aggravating the situation further. This competition problem constitutes a considerable 
obstacle to maintaining an extensive public sector at the municipal level.    
Partly in response to this competition problem, Sweden employs a far-reaching 
system for inter-regional redistribution. The stated aim is to enable all municipalities 
to provide a standard of public sector services in line with other municipalities, 
regardless of the size of the own (per capita) tax base. This system might be 
considered ambitious, but like many ambitious systems it also generates new 
problems. The extensive transfers necessary for the system to function could 
potentially be exploited for tactical, political purposes. Moreover, the far-reaching 
equalization of tax bases might affect the geographical mobility of the labour force. 
This could potentially have negative effects on long term economic growth at the 
national level. In addition, the restricted possibilities for retaining marginal increases 
in tax revenue entail severely diminished incentives for institutional competition 
between municipalities. Less institutional competition implies less policy 
experimentation and innovation and hence a less differentiated public sector. To the 
extent that policy preferences are heterogenous, this entails a loss for consumers (i.e. 
the public) which is distinct from the effect of reducing incentives to mobility. 
                                            
1 The definition of subsidiarity is discussed extensively in Söderström (2002)  
2 Restrictions on the power to tax and limits on discretion in the allocation of tax revenue imply that the 
extent of municipal self-government is debatable. Here, the focus of our attention is the restrictions on 
the power to tax; specifically, on the retention of tax revenue.   
  2It is the purpose of this article to shed some light on these potential problems, 
paying particular attention to issues pertaining to political economy and economic 
growth. The following questions are addressed: to what extent does the design of the 
system allow for politically motivated, tactical redistribution? How might far-reaching 
inter-regional redistribution be expected to effect labour force mobility? What 
consequences might such effects on mobility have on economic performance and long-
term growth? The hypothesis put forward is that the dangers of tactical redistribution 
are relatively small, yet have been given considerable attention, while the danger of 
short-circuiting a natural ‘signal’ for geographical mobility, with negative 
consequences for long-term economic performance and growth, have been largely 
overlooked.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an exhaustive analysis of the 
system for inter-regional redistribution. The article focuses on municipalities, paying 
less attention to counties. The critical analysis of related official reports is selective, 
emphasizing more recent reports.  Quantitative analysis is left to future research. The 
political economy discussion is kept simple, eschewing economic modeling in favour 
of a descriptive analysis of the extent of discretionary grants. The discussion draws 
heavily on the research of the Swedish Agency for Public Management. While some 
shortcomings of their analysis are highlighted, no attempt is made in this article to 
complement the picture they present with additional primary research. The discussion 
of potential implications for long term economic growth focuses on the link between 
inter-regional redistribution, labour force mobility, and economic growth, although 
particular attention is also paid to the effects on institutional competition between 




A decentralized public sector might be desirable even when there are substantial 
difficulties in quantifying the economic benefits. According to Stigler (1957), 
decentralization is the most suitable way to bring the political sphere close to the 
citizens, thereby enriching democratic governance and enabling the public sector to 
respond to preferences at the local level. Stigler did warn, however, of the potential 
problems posed by competition for the tax base between regions. To avoid this, the 
operations of redistribution – collection, allocation - ought to remain at the centralized 
level: “…the proper amount of redistribution… could not depend on the accidents of 
income composition of a particular community. Hence, in pure principle, the Federal 
government should collect the progressive levies and redistribute them to local units 
with each receiving an amount governed by the number of its poor and the degree of 
their poverty.”
3 In such a way, argued Stigler, all municipalities would be guaranteed a 
minimum level of public sector spending.  
One might question whether Stigler ever envisaged a system for inter-regional 
redistribution of such scope and far-reaching ambition as the one currently at work in 
Sweden. Söderström (2002) points out that Stigler’s main point seems to be that 
diversity is desirable in and of itself, regardless of economic considerations. A more 
                                            
3 Stigler (1957), p. 143 
  3stringently economic argument in favour of fiscal decentralization is presented in 
Tiebout (1956). The Tiebout hypothesis predicts that decentralization enables a greater 
degree of heterogeneity in the design of the public sector. Provided mobility between 
regions is free, the population is then able to ‘vote with their feet’ and locate in the 
region most in line with their own preferences. If all individuals locate in this manner, 
aggregate welfare can be expected to increase.    
The foundations of the Swedish system of local self-government  were laid 
down as early as 1862. The public sector has expanded considerably in the 20
th 
century, at the local levels and at the national level. Söderström (2002) refers to a 
‘Nordic model’ of fiscal federalism, since the scale and scope of the local level public 
sectors in the Nordic countries (except Iceland) is unparalleled in the rest of the 
world.
4 The main source of financing for the extensive local level public sector is 
through local income taxes.
5 Local taxation is hence considerably higher than in most 
other countries. Söderström’s ‘Nordic model’ of fiscal federalism is thus characterized 
by an extensive public sector at local levels, and by the high level of local taxation.   
Swedish municipalities have differing abilities to finance public sector services 
through relying only on their own tax bases. In 2001, the per capita tax base of the 
municipality of Danderyd was 174 percent of the national average, the highest in the 
country, compared to 79 percent for the municipality of Årjäng, the lowest in the 
country. Without tax base equalization, Årjäng would need a municipal tax rate of 26 
percent, and Danderyd a municipal tax rate of 12 percent, to attain the national average 
(per capita) municipal tax revenue.
6 In addition, there are structural cost differences, 
e.g. demographic or geographic factors that result in different costs across 
municipalities for providing service of an equivalent standard to other municipalities. 
Without inter-regional redistribution, these large discrepancies in income and cost 
structures would generate substantial differences in either tax rates or provision of 
public sector services, or both.  
The prototype for the current system of redistribution between municipalities 
was introduced in 1966. Originally, the system consisted of tax base equalization 
between municipalities and discretionary, purpose-specific grants  from the central 
government. In 1993 the majority of the purpose-specific grants were replaced by a 
general grant that is not tied to any specific purposes. The 1993 reform also separated 
the equalization transfers between municipalities into three categories: compensation 
for differences in tax revenue, compensation for structural cost differences, and 
compensation for municipalities with negative population growth.  
The general framework of the current system was introduced in 1996. It 
consists of two similarly designed parts, one for municipalities and one for counties. 
Since its inception, this system has been continuously updated, most notably through 
the 2005 reform discussed below, but many of the essential features have remained 
intact. The current system for inter-regional redistribution consists of tax revenue 
                                            
4 According to Söderström (2002), municipalities and counties account for approx. 70 percent of total 
public spending. Healthcare, schools, and community services make up approximately three quarters of 
this spending. 
5 In Sweden, income tax is raised at all three levels of government: municipalities, counties, and the 
national level, although the latter is in effect a marginal income tax, only paid by the highest tax 
brackets.  
6 Figures taken from Berggren and Tingvall (2005). 
  4equalization, compensation for structural cost differences, a general, non-discretionary 
grant from the central government and the so called införanderegler, “introduction 
rules”.
7 There is in addition to these transfers also a number of discretionary, purpose-
specific grants from the central government which to a varying degree can be 
considered transfers from the central to local government. 
As of 1996, all municipalities are affected by the system of inter-regional 
redistribution, although following the 2005 reforms fewer municipalities with higher-
than-average levels of taxable income are required to contribute. The core principle is 
that all municipalities and counties be able to provide public sector services of an 
equivalent standard, regardless of the size of the local tax base or structural cost 
differences. The system is exceptionally far-reaching in its ambition to equalize 
revenue, even compared to the other Nordic countries. The system is intended to 
compensate municipalities and counties for differences in tax bases and structural cost 
differences only. In principle, the system should not compensate for differences in 
efficiency or ambition regarding the public sector at the local levels.
 8  
As a result of the 1996 reforms, the system for tax revenue equalization 
became fiscally neutral at the national level. The equalizing transfers were hence 
financed entirely by the municipalities and counties themselves, so that the total sum 
of transfers paid out equal the total sum of transfers received by the system. The 
essential feature of the system put in place in 1996 has been to ensure that no 
municipality or county differs greatly from the national average in (post-transfer) per 
capita tax revenue.
9  
The system for inter-regional redistribution introduced in 1996 received much 
criticism for being overly obtuse. The system underwent continuous assessment and 
improvement, and following a government decision in 2001 a parliamentary 
committee was formed and given the task of evaluating the system in its current 
form.
10 In September 2003, the conclusions of the committee were presented in the 
report  Gemensamt finansierad utjämning i kommunsektorn (SOU 2003:88). At the 
same time, a study of the financial flows in the system for inter-regional redistribution 
was carried out by the Swedish Agency for Public Management, resulting in the report 
Statsbidragen till kommuner och landsting: en kartläggning och analys (Statskontoret 
2003:5), also published in 2003.  
In May 2004 the Ministry of Finance presented its proposal 2003/04:155, 
based on the recommendations made in SOU 2003:88. Several of these were adopted 
                                            
7 The introduction rules, essentially a form of temporary rebate on transfers, were aimed at smoothing 
sudden increases in liabilities following the introduction of the new legislation. The main beneficiaries 
were the municipalities with high levels of per capita tax revenue that had not previously been required 
to contribute to the system.  
8 It is open to debate whether this principle is in fact applied. See for example the discussion in 
Söderström (2002). 
9 Municipalities and counties with higher than average per capita tax revenues become net contributors 
to the system, while those falling below the national average are net beneficiaries. The transfer 
providing the equalization of per capita tax revenue is calculated by comparing the average per capita 
taxable income in each municipality and county with the national average. The differential is multiplied 
by the county-wide tax rate, länsvisa skattesatsen. The result constitutes the tax revenue equalization 
transfer. In 2003, these horizontal transfers between municipalities amounted to SEK 14 billion, mainly 
from urban areas to rural regions.   
10  Utjämningskommittén 
  5in January 2005. The complete eradication of differences in per capita tax revenue 
achieved previously has been relaxed somewhat, allowing for slightly larger 
differences between municipalities. Starting in 2005, all municipalities are assigned a 
theoretical revenue of 115 percent of the average per capita tax revenue for all 
municipalities. The theoretical revenue is calculated using the average national tax rate 
for all municipalities, and includes the general grant from the central government. 
Municipalities falling short of the 115 percent target receive a government grant 
making up for 95 percent of the shortfall. By using the national average tax rate for 
calculating the theoretical revenue, municipalities are prevented from exploiting the 
harmonizing grant to offset low taxes.
11 Municipalities with theoretical revenues in 
excess of the 115 percent target are expected to transfer 85 percent of the theoretical 
revenue surplus to the central government.  
The compensation for structural costs differences was separated into two 
components: a cost difference compensation grant, similar in definition to what 
preceded it, and a structural grant, comprising those parts of the previous 
compensation transfers that could most readily be characterized as regional policy. 
The general, non-discretionary grant was given a different label (regleringsbidrag 
instead of generellt statsbidrag) but remained essentially unchanged, with one 
important caveat. Whereas the general grant had already previously been well suited to 
regulate the total financial flows form the central to local governments, this purpose 
has now become explicit. The regleringsbidrag is flexible by nature, and adjust in 
relation to the budget constraint, once the other disbursements have been made. This 
change can be seen as a direct response to the tax revenue equalization grant no longer 
being fiscally neutral at the central government level. The (per capita) amounts 
received are roughly the same for all municipalities and counties. The official report 
SOU 2003:88 recommended that a large number of the remaining discretionary grants 
be incorporated in the general grant, and to some extent this has been the case, through 
the 2005 reform. As a consequence, the total general government government to 
municipalities has increased from SEK 41.4 billion in 2004 to SEK 55.2 billion in 
2005.
12 
The compensation for structural cost differences is fiscally neutral at the 
national level. It is calculated using the so called method of standard costs
13, with 
subsections based on a large number of quantifiable factors relating to each cost-
incurring activity. The method has been criticized for its complexity. The 
compensating transfer is only intended to cover differences in costs beyond the control 
of the municipalities and counties themselves, e.g. demographic or geographic 
                                            
11 For municipalities chosing to set the tax rate below the county wide average, negative marginal 
effects can occur. In these cases, an increase in the per capita tax base would result in lower net 
revenues for the municipality. To avoid such outcomes, referred to as ‘Pomperipossa effects’ in 
reference to a Swedish childrens’ story, an adjustment was introduced in 2001 guaranteeing every 
municipality 95 percent of the average per capita tax base increase for all municipalities, and 5 percent 
reflecting growth in the own tax base.  
12 Figures reported in Berggren and Tingvall (2005), p. 27 
13 standardkostnadmetoden 
  6factors.
14 Measures were taken to facilitate the transition to the new system, through 
temporary adjustment allowances to municipalities facing large changes in revenues.
15  
To sum up, the 2005 reform implied two important changes: firstly, the 
equalization of per capita tax revenue is no longer fiscally neutral at the central 
government level, and secondly, “only” 85 percent of excess tax revenue is transferred 
from affluent municipalities to the central government, compared to 95 percent prior to 




The political economy of inter-regional distribution 
 
The effect of economic variables on electoral outcomes has long been an object of 
study. Stigler (1973) argued that such an analysis ought to focus on the redistribution 
between groups, rather than economic conditions in general. In Stigler (1973), the state 
of the economy had no significant effect on American voters during the period studied. 
This, Stigler argued, reflects the electorate’s perception that both parties to an equal 
degree desire good economic conditions. Redistribution, on the other hand, entails 
winners and losers and could hence be expected to have a significant effect on the 
electoral outcome: “one cannot support both a rise and a fall in the share of income 
going to farmers, or the share of progressive taxes in the revenue system, or the share 
of income transferred to the poor.”
17   
A number of (Swedish) contributions to the discussion about tactical 
redistribution make explicit reference to the current Swedish system for inter-regional 
redistribution and central government grants to local governments. The scale and 
scope of the transfers and grants imply a significant risk that the system be abused, for 
example through tactical redistribution with the intention of buying voter support. This 
section focuses on the contributions of Johansson (1999, 2001), Dahlberg and 
Johansson  (2000, 2002), Jordahl (2002), and Hanes (2003).  
The majority of these studies refer to a number of seminal American studies of 
tactical redistribution in the US during the New Deal era. These studies, notably 
Arrington (1969), Wright (1974), Wallis (1996), and Anderson and Tollison (1991) 
reach different conclusions regarding the hypothesis that regional grants during the 
                                            
14 In 2000, approximately SEK 5.2 billion was redistributed between municipalities to compensate for 
structural cost differences. In general, municipalities in and around larger cities were net beneficiaries, 
as were the more remote, rural municipalities. All other regions were net contributors.  
15 The 1996 reform of the system for inter-regional redistribution brought about large changes in 
revenue for certain municipalities, most notably for those with high levels of taxable income. To 
ameliorate the short term impact of the changes, temporary adjustments grants were disbursed, 
facilitating the transition. Similarly, following the 2005 reform, an adjustment grant is to be disbursed 
over a maximum of six years, ensuring that no municipality faces reductions in income due to changes 
in the system for inter-regional redistribution amounting to more than 0.08 percent of the local tax base.  
16 Net transfers, the poorest municipalities are guaranteed 113 percent of the average per capita tax base 
for all municipalities, while the most affluent municipalities can attain at most 124 percent. Figures 
taken from Berggren and Tingvall (2005). Actual differences are greater than this, but as a result of 
preferences regarding tax rates and levels of public sector service provision. See Berggren et al. (2003), 
pp. 10-11.  
17 Stigler (1973), p. 167 
  7New Deal era were tactically motivated.
18 Arrington (1969) notes that the allocation of 
grants appeared to benefit states where income levels were already high. Wright 
(1974) uses political variables in a regression analysis of the allocation of grants, and 
concludes that certain political variables had greater explanatory power for these 
allocations than did strictly economic variables. Wright assumes that vote maximizing 
tactical redistribution ought to focus on states with a higher proportion of swing 
voters. He finds some evidence for a correlation between grants and swing voters, and 
concludes that differences between states in the allocation of grants in part could be 
attributed to the vote maximizing behaviour of politicians. Anderson and Tollison 
(1991) develop the arguments put forward by Wright, by adding a number of political 
variables found to be partially significant. Their conclusions have been questioned in 
Wallis (1996), whose study includes the New Deal period but also later years. His 
conclusion is that the economic variables played a central role for the allocation of 
grants, whereas political variables did not.  
Johansson (1999, 2001) examines potentially tactical redistribution between 
Swedish regions, focusing in particular on central government grants to municipalities. 
Johansson (2001) notes that the American studies of tactical redistribution generally 
lack robust theoretical foundations on which to base conclusions about potential 
attempts to buy voter support. The main theoretical model used in Johansson (1999, 
2001) as well as Dahlberg and Johansson (2000, 2002) is based on the model 
presented in Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998), which is a development of a model 
presented in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan 
model two rival parties use grants to gain votes. The voters are influenced by a 
combination of purely political preferences and the level of consumption offered  by 
either party. The relative strength of political preferences compared to consumption 
levels offered determines how easily votes can be bought; sufficiently large grants can 
bring a voter to vote against his political preferences. When dividing the voters into 
groups, such as municipalities, the model predicts that the magnitude of grants 
received by the group increases in the number of swing voters in that group. Groups 
with large numbers of swing voters should thus become major beneficiaries of 
discretionary grants.  
A model similar in form, but arriving at different conclusions, is presented in 
Cox and McCubbin (1986). In this model, voters are divided into three categories: 
supporters, opponents and swing voters. The Cox-McCubbin model predicts that vote 
maximizing, risk averse politicians will chose the least risky investment, to the benefit 
of the supporter group, and at the expense of both other groups. This model hence 
suggests a direct correlation between grants and political preferences. The two models 
share the assumption that voters react positively to regional grants.  
Johansson (2001) conducts an extensive survey of the total allocation of central 
government grants to municipalities, in order to investigate whether more grants are 
allocated to regions with a relatively large share of swing voters. The results are 
unclear. Johansson concludes that her investigation lends support to the hypothesis 
that central government grants are used to buy voter support, yet this conclusion is not 
evident from the analysis that precedes it. Of the two political variables that are tested, 
                                            
18 Recent applied work also includes Levitt and Snyder (1995, 1997).  
 
  8one is found to be insignificant.
19 Johansson recommends prudence in drawing 
conclusions from the result, due to the small number of observations.
20 Johansson 
(2001) only covers central government grants during the period 1981-95, and hence 
does not take into consideration the significant changes to the system that have taken 
place since 1995, although she notes that there is less scope for discretionary grants 
following the 1993 reform. Johansson estimates that prior to the 1993 reforms, 
discretionary, special-purpose grants constituted approximately 25 percent of 
municipalities’ incomes, while the general purpose, non-discretionary grants amounted 
to approximately 5 percent. Following the reform, the former constituted 
approximately 7-8 percent of municipalities’ incomes, while the latter amounted to 
approximately 15 percent. Johansson does not show how she has arrived at these 
figures. While the figures illustrate the broad changes of the system, the estimate of 
the extent of discretionary grants is considerably higher than the estimate contained in, 
for example, the Swedish Agency for Public Management report 2003:5 (as discussed 
below).   
The notion of swing voters is central to the political economy analysis in 
Johansson (2001). The exact definition of a swing voter is, however, problematic, and 
constitutes the weak link in Johansson’s quantitative analysis. Johansson refers to 
studies by Case (2001) and Strömberg (2001) defining swing voters by use of a 
closeness proxy. By this method, the number of swing voters in a region is defined by 
how close the outcome of the previous election was. Using this definition, Johansson 
fails to find evidence of tactical redistribution in order to buy voter support. Instead, 
Johansson relies on factor analysis based on electoral surveys. The implicit assumption 
is that the variable denoting ideological preferences can be expressed as a linear 
combination of the variables in the electoral surveys.
21 Bearing in mind the limitations 
on data, the assumptions underlying the definition of swing voters, and the unclear 
results of the quantitative analysis, it is hard to join Johansson in her conclusion that 
the results support the hypothesis that central government grants are used to buy 
votes.
22   
Dahlberg and Johansson (2000) contains a detailed discussion of the actual 
mechanism for discretionary allocation of central government grants to Swedish 
municipalities. The discussion is facilitated by focusing solely on grants to 
municipalities in support of local investment programs for ecologically sustainable 
development. In 1998, these grants amounted to SEK 2.3 billion. According to 
Dahlberg and Johansson, these grants were characterized by the complete lack of 
transparent regulation of allocations, and by a very large direct influence of the 
government on the allocation of grants. After preparatory work by the Ministry of the 
Environment it was the government’s prerogative to decide which applications to 
approve and the amounts disbursed. The authors contrast this against the ‘traditional’ 
central government grants, allocated according to clear, predetermined codes and 
                                            
19 Johansson (2001), p. 29 
20 ”…though some caution certainly is needed having in mind the relatively few observations available.” 
Johansson (2001), p. 29 
21 Johansson (2001) p. 26 
22 “The results support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes.” 
Johansson (2001), abstract, p. 1 
  9regulations. Dahlberg and Johansson find evidence that the allocation of ‘ecological’ 
central government grants has been used as a means of tactical redistribution, as 
predicted by the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model. They do not, however, 
find evidence that the grants have been allocated to the own supporter groups, as 
predicted by the Cox-McCubbin model. The conclusions in Dahlberg and Johansson 
(2000) are more stringent that those in Johansson (2001). Although their analysis is 
solely concerned with one type of grant, during one single year, their analysis does 
yield some support for the hypothesis that discretionary grants are abused for purposes 
of buying voter support.   
The conclusions arrived at in Dahlberg and Johansson (2000) is given further 
support by Hanes (2003), who examines the allocation of temporary, central 
government grants during the period 1982-1988. Hanes’s results are mixed but lend 
some support to the hypothesis that these grants were used for tactical redistribution. 
Hanes emphasizes that the temporary grants, unlike the regular grants, are vaguely 
formulated and have entailed considerable discretionary power for the government. 
The temporary grants under study in Hanes (2003) seized to exist in 1992. His 
conclusions do not have direct bearing on the current system of inter-regional 
redistribution, but they do lend further support to the hypothesis that discretionary 
central government grants are abused for tactical/political purposes.  
Jordahl (2002) examines the connections between central government grants to 
municipalities and electoral outcomes in the parliamentary elections of 1991 and 1994. 
Jordahl finds no evidence of a significant correlation for total grants or general grants, 
but does find a statistically significant correlation between specific grants and electoral 
outcomes. He finds some weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that allocation is 
affected by the proportion of swing voters, but suggests that the difficulties in defining 
swing voters in a satisfactory way calls for prudence in interpreting the results.    
A shortcoming of almost all the Swedish studies discussed above is the lack of 
detailed discussion of the actual design of the Swedish system for inter-regional 
redistribution and allocation of central government grants to counties and 
municipalities. Johansson (1999, 2001) and Jordahl (2002) in particular conduct 
elaborate quantitative analysis without really tackling the question of how much scope 
there is in practice for tactical redistribution (see discussion below). The current 
Swedish system might only have limited similarities with, for example, the US under 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. This potential flaw lends an insinuating tone to the repeated 
parallels drawn between the American literature on tactical redistribution and the 
current system for inter-regional redistribution.  
Special purpose grants 
 
To what extent does the current system allow for discretionary grants? According to 
the Swedish constitution, parliament has executive power over fiscal affairs, but for 
reasons of efficiency a considerable amount of the decision-making is done by the 
government. The budget, which is presented by the government and ratified by the 
parliament, describes the allocation of funds in the form of appropriations. The 
  10appropriations specify purposes and amounts, and belong to one of three 
subcategories, with different restrictions.
23  
Appropriations are grouped into twenty-seven spending categories, each with a 
predetermined spending limit. In practice, parliamentary decisions regarding these 
appropriations are taken at an aggregate level, leaving the details of the disbursements 
up to the government. The government, in turn, gives directions regarding the 
appropriations,  regleringsbrev, to the authorities concerned, specifying what funds 
have been allocated and for what purposes.    
The appropriations allow the government considerable influence on the 
allocation of funds. Appropriations can be broken down into separate parts for 
allocation across different recipients/purposes. Appropriations, or parts thereof, can 
also be made conditional upon, for example, total amounts to be received by a certain 
recipient or used for a specific purpose. As a consequence of this method of allocating 
funds, it is not always clearly apparent when an appropriation has municipalities (or 
counties) as its recipients. For their report, the researchers at the Swedish Agency for 
Public Management conducted close to one hundred interviews with employees at 
more than fifty government works, in order to estimate the number of appropriations 
designated for municipalities and/or counties. The report estimates that 127 
appropriations have been partially or entirely allocated to municipalities and/or 
counties.  
The common distinction between general grants and special-purpose grants is 
not entirely adequate. Instead, the report by Swedish Agency for Public Management 
(2003:5) uses the categories 1-3 to describe to what extent an appropriation is intended 
for municipalities and counties. Category 1 contains grants that are entirely designated 
to municipalities and counties. Category 2 consists of grants that are only in part 
intended for municipalities and counties. Category 3 comprises those grants that are 
not explicitly intended for municipalities or counties, but where the Swedish Agency 
for Public Management found municipalities and counties to be the direct recipients. 
The subcategories “all”, “some” and “mixed” are used to indicate whether the 
appropriations was received by all, or only only some, municipalities and/or counties. 
“Mixed” implies that an appropriation was received in part by all, and in part only by 
some.    
In its report, the Swedish Agency for Public Management examined 
government grants to both municipalities and counties. No attempt is made to arrive at 
separate estimates for municipalities only. There is however no indication in SOU 
2003:5 or the report by the Swedish Agency for Public Management that there exist 
systematic differences between grants to municipalities and grants to counties. The 
bulk of grants of disbursed are received by municipalities. This holds true for all the 
categories (1-3) and hence the compilation in the report by the Swedish Agency for 
                                            
23 Specifically: obetecknade anslag, with hard budget constraints and where funds may not be carried 
over into the following fiscal year, reservationsanslag, also with hard budget constraints but allowing 
for funds not spent to be carried over into the following fiscal year, and ramanslag, with softer budget 
constraints (a credit of max. 10 percent of the ramanslag may be used, but must be compensated for in 
the following fiscal year) and permitting carrying over of funds not spent to the following fiscal year. 
The ramanslag constitute the majority of the approximately 500 appropriation in the government 
budget.  
  11Public Management may be considered a good indication of the distribution of grants 
to municipalities. 
There are measurement difficulties involved when compiling data on central 
government grants to local governments. The definition of what grants to include in 
category 3 is particularly arbitrary, and in many cases the categorization is based on 
interviews with people involved in the workings of the system. Likewise, the 
pecuniary extent of these grants is based on arbitrary judgments. In those cases where 
a grant has been deemed to be partially disbursed to municipalities and/or counties, the 
researchers at the Swedish Agency for Public Management have made their own 
assessment of to what extent the appropriations should be listed under category 3. This 
differs from categories 1 and 2 which do not contain the same arbitrary judgments.  
While grants are allocated to the three categories, the distribution across 
municipalities and counties is not revealed. Variation in amounts disbursed is not 
discussed for those grants received by all municipalities/counties. No distinction is 
made between grants received by “some” municipalities/counties whether the number 
of receivers is two or two hundred. From a political economy perspective, these 
differences are important, and this lack of detail means that the report by the Swedish 
Agency for Public Management presents only a perfunctory picture of the allocation of 
grants. Table 1 shows the result from the report.   
 
Table 1 : Distribution of grants to municipalities and counties for the fiscal year 2001 (number of 
grants)
24 
Recipient\Category  Category 1  Category 2  Category 3  Total: 
All 9  9  -  18 
Some    8 17  - 25 
Mixed  2 10  - 12 
Total 19  36  72  127\55 
 
The grants in category 3 constitute the majority of the total number of grants (72 of 
127 grants in total). In the report from the Swedish Agency for Public Management, 
these grants are not grouped into the subcategories “all”, “some”, and “mixed”. For the 
grants in categories 1 and 2, “some” constitutes the most prominent subcategory (25 of 
55 grants in total). Merely 9 of the 55 grants in categories 1 and 2 are in their entirety 
directed toward all municipalities and/or counties.  
Table 1 does not shed light on whether discretionary grants are used for 
tactical, political purposes. It does however give an indication of the degree of 
transparency in the allocation of grants. The grants deemed the least transparent from 
the perspective of inter-regional redistribution, i.e. those in category 3, are the most 
numerous. Moreover, the largest subcategory (“some”) consists of grants allocated to a 
selection of municipalities and/or counties. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
grants in category 3, as well as all those in the subcategory “some”, allow the greatest 
amount of discretion in their allocation. The large number of such grants should hence 
be considered problematic from a political economy perspective.  
The appropriations in category 3 are the most numerous, but constitute a 
relatively small share of total spending. In terms of volume, it is category 1 that 
dominates, constituting 89 percent of total grant spending. To clarify this discrepancy, 
                                            
24 Data contained in the report by the Swedish Agency for Public Management  (Statskontoret 2003:5). 
  12tables 2 and 3 contain the same appropriations as table 1 but expressed in pecuniary 
terms and as shares of total government grants to municipalities and counties.
25 
Category 1 is dominated by the general purpose grant and the municipal tax 
revenue equalization grant. The general purpose grant is more or less the same (per 
capita) for all municipalities. The size of the tax revenue equalization grant, on the 
other hand, varies greatly between municipalities. Both grant forms are clearly rule-
based and non-discretionary.  
 
table 2.4.2: distribution of anslag to municipalities and counties, for the fiscal year 2001 (SEK 
million)
26 
Recipient\Category  Category 1  Category 2  Category 3  Total: 
All 96619.8  2843.4  -   
Some   24588.5  1128.4  -   
Mixed 2372.7  6589.8  -   
Total 123581.0  9661.6  5349.0  138591.6 
 
Table 2.4.3: distribution of anslag to municipalities and counties, for the fiscal year 2001 (%l of  total) 
Recipient\Category  Category 1  Category 2  Category 3  Total: 
All 69.72%  2.05%  -   
Some   17.74%  0.81%  -   
Mixed 1.71%  4.75%  -   
Total 89.17%  6.97%  3.86%  100% 
 
The large number of appropriations in category 3 implies that the individual grants are 
small: 72 appropriations share SEK 5.349 billion, less than four percent of total 
disbursements, compared to category 1 where a mere 19 appropriations amount to 
SEK 123.6 billion. For selective, directed grants to have a significant political effect 
would require the small, special purpose grants to be exceptionally effective in 
affecting electoral outcomes. This observation does not contradict the claim that the 
selective, directed grants constitute a genuine political economy concern. The 
allocation of those grants comprising category 3 is characterized by a lack of 
transparency, thus increasing the scope for buying voter support or accruing 
disproportionate benefits to special interest groups. The 2005 reform incorporated a 
number of smaller grants into the general grant, as did the previous 1996 reform. From 
a political economy perspective, this is clearly a positive development.   
As mentioned earlier, the summary of financial flows presented in the report by 
the Swedish Agency for Public Management is not entirely satisfactory from a 
political economy perspective. The categorization matrix, defined by the headings 1-3 
and sub-headings “all”, “some”, and “mixed”, does not offer much information on 
variation in disbursements between recipients, and does not distinguish between grants 
disbursed to many (but not all) municipalities or counties, and grants received by only 
the very few. There is clearly a need for more research into the distribution of these 
selectively allocated grants. 
                                            
25 These tables are my own and are not contained in the report by the Swedish Agency for Public 
Management. The tables are in effect summaries of calculations in that report.  
26 Calculations based on figures for individual spending areas, as reported by the Swedish Agency for 
Public Management report 2003:5.  
  13The Swedish studies of tactical redistribution discussed above are highly aware 
of political economy problems, but also, generally, lack strong relevance for an 
analysis of the current system for inter-regional redistribution. Moreover, the Swedish 
Government Official Report SOU 2003:88 and the Swedish Agency for Public 
Management Report 2003:5 present a detailed descriptive analysis of this system, but 
consistently avoid any reference to a political economy perspective. Strikingly, the 
recommendation put forward in SOU 2003:88, that the number and volume of 
discretionary grants be reduced further (as was the case in the January 2005 reform), 
makes no explicit reference to political economy considerations.
27 As for the Swedish 
Agency for Public Management report, the surprising lack of detail regarding the 
distribution (across recipients) of selectively allocated grants suggests a similar 
reluctance to express (perhaps even to perceive) the problem at hand in political 
economy terms.  
 
Inter-regional redistribution from a growth perspective 
 
As mentioned above, a large public sector at the municipality level might require an 
extensive system for tax revenue equalization, to avoid excessive tax competition 
between municipalities. Direct redistribution at the local level entails the risk of losing 
high income residents to municipalities with low tax rates, and attract new residents 
with low incomes. Moreover, in order to provide services of an equivalent standard to 
that of other municipalities, those with low levels of taxable incomes would be 
required to set tax rates at prohibitively high levels. This could be expected to 
contribute further to migratory flows to municipalities with low tax rates, causing the 
fiscal situation to deteriorate further, and pushing local tax rates even higher. It is less 
evident, however, that tax revenue equalization between municipalities needs to be as 
far-reaching as is currently the case in Sweden. The modifications to the system 
introduced in January 2005 allow for slightly larger discrepancies in municipal tax 
bases, but the change is small: the maximum difference in tax bases, net equalizing 
transfers, increased from (approximately) five to ten percent, hardly an order of 
magnitude.
28 The other Nordic countries also maintain large public sectors at the 
municipal level, but not to the same extent as Sweden.  
There are a number of potentially harmful effects of extensive inter-regional 
redistribution. The equalization of tax revenue is fiscally neutral at the national level, 
                                            
27 Rather, the emphasis on their recommendation is on efficiency gains, along the lines of the Tiebout 
hypothesis. If the welfare enhancing efficiency gains from decentralization is a function of 
heterogeneity at the municipality level, special purpose grants and other forms of designated funds 
entail the risk of reduced welfare. In addition, designating the use of allocated funds for specific 
purposes also conflicts with the principle of local self-government. 
28 As described earlier, the current system brings all municipalities to within the range of 113-124 
percent of the average per capita tax base, including the regulating grant (regleringsbidrag) from the 
central government. (Figures taken from Berggren and Tingvall 2005.) Under the previous system, all 
municipalities were brought within the range of 99-104 percent of the average per capita tax base, not 
including the general government grant (figures taken from SOU 2003:88). Since the regulating grant as 
well as the general grant that preceded it was disbursed with approximately the same per capita amount 
to all municipalities, these figures can be meaningfully compared as an indication of the discrepancies 
in the tax base accommodated by the system.    
  14i.e. disbursements equal receipts to the system. The current design implies 
considerably reduced incentives to municipalities to strengthen their own tax bases. 
Indeed, a number of municipalities have faced a so called “Pomperipossa effect”, 
whereby an increase in taxable per capita incomes in the municipalities entails a net 
loss in revenue for the municipality. The reduction of the levy on excess tax bases 
from 95 to 85 percent, as described earlier, will hopefully go some way in avoiding 
such effects. Nonetheless, this does little to alter the conclusion that the incentives to 
increase the own municipality tax base are severely reduced by a system of far-
reaching tax base equalization. Weak incentives to strengthen the local tax base can be 
expected to have negative effects on economic growth, as a result of reduced 
competition between municipalities and, consequently, a lower pace of rationalization 
as well as experimentation and innovation. A less differentiated public sector implies 
limited possibilities to cater to individuals’ heterogenous policy preferences, as 
envisaged by Stigler or Tiebout (as discussed previously).  There is also the view put 
forward by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), who argue that tax competition need in fact 
not be a problem. Rather, they see large public sectors at the municipality level 
without inter-regional redistribution as a means to foster competition within the public 
sector, improving performance and limiting expansionary tendencies. Their point of 
view is perhaps not easily reconciled with the ambitions of the Swedish welfare state, 
but it lends support to the argument that the presence of extensive inter-regional 
redistribution most likely generates a considerable reduction of competitive pressure 
between municipalities, resulting in inferior performance and negative effects on 
economic growth.
29   
One example of the consequences of reduced institutional competition between 
municipalities is the reduced incentives for construction of new housing at the 
municipal level. Söderström (2002) stresses that this could have particularly harmful 
effects on the Stockholm region, known for its housing shortage. This shortage of 
housing in and around Stockholm is regrettable from a growth perspective. The region 
is central to economic development in Sweden, and economic efficiency requires 
labour to be allocated to economically dynamic sectors and regions. This points to a 
related problem: there are reasons to expect that extensive inter-regional redistribution 
reduces labour force mobility, with negative effects on economic growth as a direct 
result.  
From a static viewpoint, efficient allocation of resources requires factors of 
production to be allocated so as to achieve the highest productivity. Simply put, if a 
factor of production is allocated suboptimally, an improvement can always be made by 
reallocating to where productivity is higher. Optimal allocation has an equalizing 
effect whereby the marginal product converges for a factor of production, regardless of 
its allocation. Suboptimal allocation results in different marginal products for the same 
factor of production, depending on its allocation. This inefficient allocation constitutes 
a dead weight loss, since the factor of production is evidently not used where it 
achieves the highest productivity.   
From a dynamic, long term viewpoint, a market economy in which economic 
growth reflects increased productivity requires continuous adaptation and structural 
                                            
29 The link between competition, increased productivity and economic growth is taken for granted and 
not elaborated on in this article.  
  15adjustment, a process famously described as ‘creative destruction’ in Schumpeter 
(1942).  Rapid technological change and increasing trade flows and international 
competition increase the need for the economy to adapt easily to changing conditions. 
To avoid dead weight losses, factors of production must be continuously reallocated to 
those sectors and regions where they achieve the highest productivity. The 
geographical mobility of the labour force is an important, natural component of this 
adaptive process. Gunderson (1994) summarizes this development: “In essence, a 
strong internal market is necessary to compete in external markets.”
30 This adaptation, 
he points out, takes place both at the ‘upside’ location, through firm creation, 
vacancies and labour shortages, and the ‘downside’ location, through plant closures, 
redundancies and increased unemployment. A smoothly functioning adaptive 
mechanism can bring about a reduction in unemployment as well as a reduction in the 
bottle necks that hamper the growth of new sectors and economic development of 
regions that fare well in the competition. Economic growth is then facilitated by 
transferring labour from sectors and regions with low productivity to sectors and 
regions with higher productivity, in the process improving the competitive strength of 
the country as a whole. The importance of such an adaptation is further stressed by the 
increased global economic integration, since labour in the more developed countries, 
with significantly higher labour costs, must rely on highly productive labour to remain 
competitive. Labour force mobility can be expected to contribute to macroeconomic 
stability, by facilitating structural adjustment, thus contributing further to economic 
growth.
31 The neoclassical prediction of an equilibrium in which factor prices 
converge can be hard to reconcile with the dynamic, endogenous process taking place 
in the real world, where differences appear to be a fixture, albeit constantly evolving.
32 
Moreover, there are social costs to structural adjustment that must be taken into 
consideration. This does not, however, reduce the validity of the conclusion that an 
inefficient allocation of resources, entailing considerable differences in factor 
productivity across regions, constitutes a continuous welfare loss and contributes to a 
reduction of economic growth and development.    
Labour force mobility does entail risks of reduced growth at the local level, in 
particular if the most mobile groups are young with relatively high levels of human 
capital, as is often the case. As Myrdal pointed out, regional decline can be self-
reinforcing, leading to an even more rapid deterioration of economic conditions in the 
region.
33 Economically, the counter-argument is that if those leaving the region are 
young and well educated, this should result in higher levels of compensation for the 
young and well educated labour remaining. Moreover, new neoclassical growth theory 
describes considerable positive externalities as a result of labour force mobility: 
efficiency gains spur economic growth which in turn generates new, endogenous 
increases in economic growth. This does not contradict Myrdal’s concern regarding 
regional polarization, as opposed to regional convergence, as a direct consequence of 
labour force mobility. It should be noted, however, that if the economic gains from 
                                            
30 Gunderson (1994), p. 5 
31 A lengthy discussion of the link between macroeconomic stability and growth can be found in Fischer 
(1993). 
32See discussion on factor price convergence in Krugman och Obstfeldt (1998). 
33 See Gunderson (1994), p. 8-9. 
  16increased growth are sufficiently large, it should be possible for the losing parties to be 
compensated for this in a manner that does not hamper necessary structural 
adjustment.     
Causes of mobility – and immobility 
 
From an aggregate viewpoint it might appear self-evident that the marginal product for 
the same factor of production would converge over time. Relatively high returns to 
labour in one area should attract labour from other areas until marginal rates of return 
are the same. It is not, however, obvious how this occurs in practice, for example when 
individuals decide to relocate across regions. The model of migration presented in 
Harris and Todaro (1970) uses the observation that higher rates of workforce 
participation are not necessarily what induces individuals to move. This is given 
empirical support by the large inflows of labour to metropolitan areas in developing 
countries, despite higher unemployment rates in the cities. Standard neoclassical 
theory does not account for this behaviour: “This lack of an adequate analytical model 
to account for the unemployment phenomenon often leads to rather amorphous 
explanations such as the “bright lights” of the city acting as a magnet…”
34. Harris and 
Todaro (1970) suggest expanding the neoclassical model of migration to take into 
account individuals expected incomes, rather than comparing employment rates. The 
utility maximizing individual moves if his expected income at the new location is 
higher than his current location. Their analysis is aimed at developing countries in 
general, and tropical Africa in particular. In their model expected income is simply a 
function of wage and employment levels, which is too simplistic a framework to be 
readily transposed to developed countries. Nonetheless, their key observation, that the 
decision to migrate depends on expected income – to be precise, expect utility – rather 
than employment levels, is highly relevant for the analysis at hand.  
Another important contribution to the theoretical discussion of migration are 
those theories of human capital formation that treat the decision to migrate as an 
investment in human capital. This allows for clearer distinctions between individuals’ 
differing propensities to move. The propensity to move can differ for several reasons. 
Individuals with a longer investment horizon have greater chances of making up for 
the transaction costs of relocating and reaping returns on the decision to migrate, and 
hence have a greater propensity to move. Individuals who attain more utility from 
consumption today, and hence discount the future more heavily, are less likely to 
move due to the higher value attached to the fixed costs of relocating. On the other 
hand, the value attached to future utility can induce an individual to relocate even 
when the initial utility levels at the new location are lower, provided the expected 
future utility – the returns from migrating – is large enough to compensate for this. If 
the costs of migrating are greater than the expected return from the investment in 
human capital (relocation), the individual stays put.    
Theories of human capital formation have contributed to the understanding of 
what affects individuals’ decision to migrate, but still leaves a large number of omitted 
variables that are likely to affect individual migration in practice. Fischer et al. (1997) 
                                            
34 Harris och Todaro (1970), p. 126 
  17present a comprehensive model of individual migration. Their model incorporates the 
key conclusions of Harris and Todaro (1970) as well as those of human capital theory, 
but also includes a large number of variables and parameters that could plausibly 
determine individual decisions to migrate.  
Traditional economic explanations for mobility fail to explain why individuals, 
in practice, often chose not to move despite considerable differences in income levels. 
Fischer et al. (1997) seeks to shed light on this empirical observation, and their work 
turns out to have substantial relevance for a growth-focused analysis of the system for 
inter-regional distribution. In line with most theories of labour mobility, Fischer et al. 
take as their starting point that the decision to migrate is determined by differences at 
the macro level between countries, regions or specific locations. In the view of Fischer 
et al., these macro difference go beyond the standard economic variables to 
incorporate social, cultural, political, and ecological aspects. It is the combination of 
all the factors that constitute the macro environment of the model. The individual 
decision to migrate is formed on the basis of a comparison of the macro environments 
at home and at all potential destinations for a relocation. The main point brought home 
by Fischer et al. (1997) as that a full understanding of individual decision regarding 
migration requires a comprehensive analysis of what differences attain the largest 
weights at the macro level, as well as a detailed understanding, at the micro level, of 
how the individual decisions are made. 
At the micro level, Fischer et al. distinguish between (a) economic needs, (b) 
security and safety, (c) social needs, in particular a sense of belonging and acceptance, 
and (d) the desire for self-realization. This categorization is influenced by Maslow’s 
‘hierarchy of needs’ and reflects and interdisciplinary attempt to understand the 
motivations for human actions in general. Other non-economic variables taken into 
account at the micro level includes peace, freedom, health, and happiness. A number 
of common assumptions in conventional models of migration are discussed and 
rejected: moving, Fischer et al. point out, is not without transaction costs. Moving is 
not without risk. The potential migrants are not homogenous agents. The potential 
migrants do not have access to perfect and free information. Incomplete information 
implies that subjective factors and the degree of risk aversion play a more important 
role.
35 The potential migrants are not unboundedly rational agents, and they are not 
independent of a social context. Their sense of well-being can be greatly influenced by 
reference groups in the immediate surroundings, rather than comparisons at higher 
(national or international) levels of aggregation. The decision to migrate is seldom 
purely individual, and frequently takes other family members into account.    
Fischer et al. (1997) offers a more complex representation of the micro level 
decision to migrate. They also include a large number of non-pecuniary variables in 
their analysis. Only by taking all these factors into consideration can empirically 
observed patterns of mobility be explained as the actions of utility maximizing 
individuals. The agents in their model operate from the confines of bounded 
rationality
36, i.e. the decision to stay or go is made in a rational manner, but 
                                            
35 See the discussion in Fischer et al. (1997), pp. 64-65 
36 ”The problems with tackling complex sets of alternatives, a description which is certainly appropriate 
for many ’stay’ or ’go’ decisions, led to the concept of bounded rationality. Simon (1957, 1983) 
describes the actions of human beings as bounded by the situation they face, the experiences they have 
  18conditional on the available information, and incorporating a large number of non-
pecuniary variables. For these reasons, it is possible that relevant macro level variables 
are overlooked when the individual decides to migrate.  
The interdisciplinary model in Fischer et al. (1997) is perhaps impractical for 
economic analysis. Nonetheless, it is an important contribution to a comprehensive, 
growth-focused analysis of the system for inter-regional redistribution. A key 
conclusion of Fischer et al. (1997) is that immobility in and of itself can generate 
positive utility. In traditional theories it is mobility which is the positive force, as a 
means to increased economic efficiency, while immobility is presented as a rigidity or 
obstruction. Fischer et al. argue that this view on immobility is contradicted by the 
’paradox of immobility’, whereby most individuals chose not to migrate, despite the 
prevalence of considerable wage differentials.  
According to Fischer et al., the paradox of immobility is in part explained by 
agents’  location specific assets: insider advantages at the workplace and in one’s 
leisure time, as a function of having spent a long time at a location, constitutes a 
considerable sunk cost forgone when relocating. Workplace specific insider 
advantages can give individuals a stronger position in the local labour markets. Leisure 
specific insider advantages include social capital and good knowledge of local 
possibilities for consumption, which can enable individuals to attain a higher utility 
level given a certain budget restriction. These insider advantages are lost when 
relocating, and instead the individual faces transaction costs for generating new insider 
advantages in a new environment: “To regain space and society-specific leisure-
oriented insider advantages in a different macro-level unit is costly and time-
consuming: to stay immobile has it’s own value.”
37   
The model presented in Fischer et al. (1997) offers a detailed understanding of 
the migratory decision at the micro level. Macroeconomic variables are given a swifter 
treatment. The point they wish to make is that assorted micro level variables affect the 
manner in which individuals perceive differences between locations at the macro level. 
Fischer et al. (1997) is first and foremost concerned with the interaction of micro 
environment and macro environment that forms the basis for the decision to migrate. 
A more extensive discussion of the macro environment is, however, lacking – in 
particular, a discussion about what role might be played by an extensive, largely 
decentralized public sector and a concomitant system for inter-regional 
redistribution.
38  
Shaw (1986) examines the relationship between the public sector, regional 
policies, and migration, focusing on macroeconomic variables. Shaw tests the 
hypothesis that ‘traditional’ variables have declined in influence on individual 
decisions to migrate, while other fiscal factors have come to play an increasingly 
important role. Shaw relates this development to a crowding-out process whereby 
expanding social security systems and increased transfer reduce the effects of, for 
example, unemployment and wage differentials. This is described as a ‘short-
                                                                                                                              
acquired before, their emotional patterns and their limited computational abilities.” Fischer et al. (1997), 
p. 69.  
37 Fischer et al. (1997), p. 77 
38 The authors note that an extensive social security system can reduce incentives to migrate, but do not 
develop the argumentation further. See Fischer et al. (1997), pp. 82-83 
  19circuiting’ of the market mechanisms that normally induce labour to migrate from 
regions with low income levels to regions with higher income levels (contributing, in 
the process, to the convergence of income levels). The ’short-circuiting’ metaphor can 
be traced to the seminal studies by Courchene (1970, 1981), who argued that inter-
regional redistribution and equalization entails costs in the form of reduced efficiency, 
by creating incentives for labour to remain in relatively poor regions despite lower 
productivity and wages. Shaw also covers some of the studies arguing against 
Courchene, including Broadway and Flatters (1982). Broadway and Flatters claimed 
that extensive inter-regional redistribution was indeed motivated by efficiency 
considerations, in particular due to the competition problem, as discussed above. Shaw 
contends that the conclusion drawn in Broadway and Flatters (1982) is exaggerated 
and lacking empirical validation.  
Shaw employs Canadian migration data during the periods 1956-61, 1966-71, 
1971-76 and 1976-81. The core hypothesis, that fiscal variables have crowded out 
traditional (market-based) variables in determining labour force migration, is separated 
into two sub-hypotheses: (i) that the traditional labour market variables, in particular 
wage and unemployment levels, have declined in influence on migration flows; and 
(ii) that fiscal variables, in particular extensive systems of social security as well as 
inter-regional redistribution and related transfers, have increased in influence, 
following the system reforms in 1971 that brought about large increases in these 
variables. In his quantitative analysis, Shaw is unable to reject either hypothesis. Inter-
regional differences in wage and unemployment levels have had a decreasing effect on 
migration flows in Canada since 1971, and the fiscal variables have had an increasing 
effect. Shaw stresses the importance of distinguishing between the main hypothesis 
and the two partial hypothesis. The econometric analysis reveals the changes in effect 
of the variables over time, but does not explain causal relationships between the 
variables. The observation that the traditional variables have decreased in importance 
could potentially be attributed to other factors affecting individual preferences: 
“Income, for example, might matter less now because of diminishing marginal utility 
of money or because public goods are preferred over private goods. Furthermore, if 
recent times were characterized by slowed economic growth and slack labor 
markets… then smaller impacts of wage and job variables today might be no more 
than a transitional phenomenon caused by adverse cyclical conditions.”
39 Nonetheless, 
Shaw draws the conclusion that the fiscal variables certainly appear to have crowded 
out the traditional, market-based mechanisms in their influence on migratory flows 
between regions in Canada. The results arrived at in Shaw (1986) are hence very much 
in line with the picture presented in Courchene (1970, 1981), where economic policies, 
notably extensive systems of social security and inter-regional redistribution, ‘short-
circuit’ those market mechanisms inducing labour migration from regions of low 
productivity to regions of high productivity.  
Shaw concludes that the public sector does have an impact on migration, in 
particular through systems of social security and through inter-regional redistribution, 
but does not develop this line of reasoning further. Charney (1993) offers a more 
detailed analysis of the connections between the public sector and migratory flows. 
Charney incorporates a large number of variables into this analysis, including the 
                                            
39 Shaw (1986), p. 654 
  20relationships between public sector, firm localization, and employment growth. The 
departure point for the analysis is the hypothesis that inter-regional redistribution, 
through effectively subsidizing the cost of providing public sector services to certain 
regions, has significant effects on the tax-price of these services, creating large price 
differentials between (and within) regions. Referring to a number of related studies, 
including Day (1992), Herzog and Schlottman (1986), and Knapp and White (1993), 
Charney concludes that it is the combination of taxes and services from the public 
sector that ought to be the focus of attention.
40  
In Charney’s view, the role of the public sector in determining firm localization 
is well established.
41 Assuming a one-way relationship between employment growth 
and migratory flows
42, she concludes that a positive impact of the public sector on firm 
localization (and hence employment rates) will also attract migratory flows. As is 
explained in detail below, this relationship does not hold in the case of Sweden, where 
employment levels have little explanatory power for migration patterns. This actually 
confirms the conclusions of Charney (1993). Her analysis indicates a number of 
channels through which an extensive public sector and a far-reaching system of inter-
regional redistribution and equalization can affect geographic mobility. Inter-regional 
redistribution and equalization transfers allow for a far greater public sector at 
decentralized levels than would be possible if merely relying on the collection of local 
taxes. To the extent that firm localizations are affected by the level of public sector 
services, a larger proportion of firms will locate to subsidized areas that would 
otherwise have been the case. Firms are able to capture the benefits of localizing in 
regions of low productivity (lower labour costs, lower rents etc.) without having to 
confront some of the main disadvantages. A subsidized, and hence more extensive, 
municipal sector in and of itself creates more employment opportunities at the local 
level. These factors can be expected to have a joint effect on mobility, notably through 
reduced migration. If the local public sector is particularly extensive, as is the case in 
Sweden, is it reasonable to expect the effects to be stronger. An extensive public sector 
and far-reaching inter-regional redistribution can hence be expected to have an 
inhibiting effect on the geographical mobility of labour. This conclusion, drawn by 
Charney (1993), is entirely in line with the arguments put forward in Courchene 
(1970) and Shaw (1986), and reinforces the image of a ‘short-circuiting’ of the 
traditional market mechanisms determining the localization of the labour force across 
regions.  
The general theories of migration discussed previously all appear to 
underestimate the effects of the public sector on geographical mobility. Charney 
(1993) constitutes an important contribution to the understanding of the interactions 
between the public sector, inter-regional redistribution, and labour force mobility. A 
weakness of Charney (1993) is the reluctance of its author to clarify in what manner 
the macro variables might interact with other variables at the micro level. It should be 
                                            
40 ”The implication of studies that find significant public sector influences on migration is that areas 
with desirable fiscal packages can attract migrants.” Charney (1993), p. 318 
41 Charney (1993) refers to Bartik (1991) for a survey of the literature dealing with the relationship 
between the public sector and firm localization. See Charney, p. 320  
42 ”Because the link between jobs growth and human migration is well documented, the entire body of 
literature relating to the role of the public sector in industrial location and job growth becomes 
unavoidably tied to the analyis of human migration.” Charney (1993), p. 314 
  21noted, however, that her article is primarily intended as a survey of existing literature, 
and that this flaw might therefore be attributed to the literature on the topic in general. 
Charney points out that the relationship between the public sector and labour force 
migration is relatively unexplored. The strength of her analysis lies in the pertinent 
distinction between direct and indirect effects of the public sector on mobility, a 
distinction that shed some light on the difficulties involved in quantifying these 
effects.   
Swedish mobility – and immobility 
 
Geographical mobility in Sweden displays a declining trend since the 1960s. The 
number of moves has decreased and it is reasonable to also expect the motives for 
moving to have changed somewhat. At the beginning of the 1960s, active labour 
market policies sought to facilitate the migration out of the Norrlandslänen  (the 
counties of Norrbotten, Västerbotten, Västernorrland, Jämtland, and Gävleborg) to the 
more economically expansive industrial regions in southern and central Sweden. 
Policies focusing on promoting mobility as a means to bolster national employment 
reflected the Rehn-Meidner model with its emphasis on efficiency and increased 
productivity as key to improved standards of living. The selective, effiency-promoting 
labour market policies were succeeded, in the early 1970s, by policies promoting an 
almost polar opposite line. Criticism of the so called flyttlasspolitiken  (policies 
promoting migration) and a greater emphasis on employment security and directed 
subsidies to sectors and regions coincided with a break in the migration patterns: 
during the 1970s the skogslänen (the counties of Dalarna, Värmland, and Norrland) in 
the north became net receivers of migrants while large declines in migrant inflows 
were reported in a number of counties in central Sweden with considerable industrial 
activity.
43  
Nilsson (1995) compares the northern skogslänen counties with metropolitan 
counties during the period 1965-93 and reaches the conclusion that the 1970s saw 
increased differences between these two categories of counties in terms of active 
labour market policy efforts, and reduced differences in unemployment rates. As long 
as the labour market policies reflected the intentions of the Rehn-Meidner model, 
geographical mobility had a harmonizing effect on the regional imbalances of the 
national labour market. Nilsson describes this as a policy of structural adaptation 
where market forces played a pivotal role. By contrast, the policies introduced during 
the 1970s reduced geographical mobility and aggrevated regional differences in 
employment. This development was not primarily reflected in the unemployment 
figures of the period, but in the extensive programs for subsidies to regions and sectors 
of industry. Nilsson (1995) notes that while the new migratory patterns, counter-
productive from the point of view of factor allocation, did not actually increase 
differences in the official unemployment rates, this is most likely explained by the 
extensive labour market policies and industrial policies conducted during that decade. 
These policies did little, however, to alter the over-arching trends of structural change. 
During the period 1965-93 the unemployment rate of the skogslänen counties was at 
                                            
43 For a more detailed description of migratory patterns during the 1970s, see Nilsson (1995), pp. 18-19.  
  22an average 1.5 percentage points higher than in the metropolitan counties, and during 
the 1980s migratory patterns reverted to forms more in line with what preceded the 
1970s.
44  
A similar picture is presented in Heiborn (1998), who also attempts a 
quantitative analysis of labour force mobility in Sweden. She finds some support for 
the hypothesis that unemployment and  number of vacancies affects mobility between 
regions. She also finds evidence that labour market programs create locking-in effects. 
Heiborn’s main conclusion, however, is that her model is misspecified, and advocates 
caution in interpreting the results. This underscores the difficulties of analyzing 
migration data and points to a need for further research in this field.  
Importantly, the developments of the 1970s reveal the emergence of two 
different and not entirely compatible definitions of regional balance. The first 
definition, according to which regional balance is taken to mean a harmonization of 
employment opportunities, might be considered dominant during the 1960s. The 
second definition considers regional balance to occur when the proportions of the 
population resident in the different regions of the country remain unchanged. This 
second definition, hinging on some subjective notion of regional population 
equilibrium suggest a potential conflict of interest between labour market policies and 
regional policies.   
In August 2002, the Ministry of Industry, Employment, and Communications
45 
was commissioned by the government to investigate the possibilities for stimulating 
incentives to geographical mobility within the ramifications of existing labour market 
policies. In April 2003, the ministry presented its conclusions in the report Ökad 
rörlighet för sysselsättning och tillväxt (SOU 2003:37). The report suggests that the 
potential conflict between labour market policies and regional policies continues to be 
problematic. Moreover, they show that this conflict originates, in part, in differing 
definitions of what in fact constitutes regional balance. In line with the arguments put 
forward in Nilsson (1995), the authors of SOU 2003:37 observe that geographical 
mobility has been decreasing since the 1960s. During the mid-1990s, four percent of 
the population moved across county borders, compared to 5 percent at the end of the 
1960s. Most move only a short distance: in 1994, 85 percent of migrants moved less 
than 50 kilometers. The authors of 2003:37 also stress that the motives for migration 
have changed to an ever greater extent: labour market conditions have decreased in 
importance, while social and environmental conditions have become more important.
46 
They also emphasize the role played by developments in commuting (increases in 
numbers of commuters and distances commuted) as a precondition for the emergence 
of integrated labour markets during the recent decades.  These integrated labour 
markets entail significant improvements for employment prospects, since a more 
differentiated business sector with has better chances of coping with structural 
adjustment than small, local labour markets dominated by a small number of firms of 
sectors. This is entirely in line with the argument put forward in Nilsson (1995). 
                                            
44 Nilsson (1995) 
45 Näringsdepartementet, henceforth referred to as the Ministry of Industry 
46 See SOU 2003:37, p. 11 
  23Notably, it is a consideration that is entirely lacking in the aforementioned reports on 
the system for inter-regional redistribution.
47      
The authors of SOU 2003:37 stress that the main purpose of  labour market 
policies is to contribute to the smooth functioning of labour markets, promoting full 
employment and economic growth at the national level. They refer to proposition 
2002/03:1 in which the government states that the main aim of labour market policies 
is to match unemployed workers and vacancies. This is achieved primarily through 
state-run employment centres, job training programs, and by stimulating labour 
mobility. Labour mobility can be stimulated through grants subsidizing the costs of 
commuting or relocating.    
Geographical mobility does not, however, appear to be of great priority within 
labour market policies. Job seekers have a legal right, during the first 100 days of 
receiving unemployment benefits, to contain their job search to areas in their 
immediate proximity. The guidelines given by the National Labour Market Board 
(AMS) to the country labour boards emphasize the importance of mobility but contain 
no directions or aims relating to stimulating geographical mobility. SOU 2003:37 
refers to studies showing how local job agencies give little advice encouraging 
geographical mobility.
48 The report also notes that labour market policies have 
increasingly been assigned regional policy roles. Regional policy considerations, in 
particular the stated aim of promoting “well functioning and sustainable local labour 
markets”
49 is, in the view of the authors of SOU 2003:37, not necessarily compatible 
with the greater aim of promoting full employment and economic growth. This 
apparent conflict between labour market policy and regional policy is entirely in line 
with the argumentation put forward in Nilsson (1995), as discussed above.
50    
This conflict is also reflected in the policy suggestions presented in SOU 
2003:37. Despite having noted a potential conflict between regional policy and the 
greater aims of labour market policies, the authors nonetheless make policy 
recommendations that appear to be heavily influenced by regional policy 
considerations. They propose an increase in subsidies to long distance commuters and 
labour market policies designed to encourage ‘key workers’ to move to supported 
regions. They also suggest abolishing a number of relocation subsidies. The 
motivation given for the latter suggestion is that these subsidies are frequently 
received by individuals that would have moved anyway. The former suggestions, 
which are not given explicit motivation, display a profound focus on dysfunctional 
local labour markets, and a lack of consideration of the aggregate, national labour 
market. In particular, a discussion of long term dynamic effects of labour market 
policies is entirely lacking. The report notes the labour shortage experienced by a 
number of regions and business sectors. The report also mentions the 2002 business 
survey
51 where labour shortages were listed as the single most important impediment 
to growth faced by small firms. Yet despite these insights the policy suggestions 
                                            
47 An interesting perspective on Swedish inter-regional migration is provided by the literature dealing 
with Swedish settlement policies regarding immigrants. See for example Edin et al (2004).    
48 SOU 2003:37 fails to specify what reports are being referred to. See SOU 2003:37, p. 13 
49 SOU 2003:37, p. 13 
50For an informative dicussion of the shortcomings of Swedish regional policy in promoting 
employment and growth, see Andersson (2005).   
51 Företagsbarometern 2002, annual business survey referenced in SOU 2003:37, p. 29 
  24contained in the report serve only to stimulate migration to economically stagnant 
regions. The report 2003:37 must hence be considered a prime example of how 
economic policies discussed without attempts at a comprehensive, evolutionary 
analysis run the risk of becoming seriously misguided.
52  
The Ministry of Industry report SOU 2003:37 notes that it is difficult to 
stimulate mobility outside of the natural migratory patterns.
53 From a policy 
perspective, it is puzzling, given this observation, that no reference is made to the 
possibility of reducing those factors inhibiting such ‘natural migratory patterns’. On a 
couple of occasions, the report mentions how the decline in mobility during the 1970s 
and 1980s coincided with a rapid expansion of the public sector, providing 
opportunities for individuals to remain in and around regional centres. This 
development, whereby an extensive public sector contributes to an inefficient 
geographical allocation of labour, is not discussed further at any point in the report. 
That exceptionally extensive inter-regional redistribution might reinforce such a 
tendency is not mentioned.  
The authors of SOU 2003:37 recognize that imbalances in the Swedish housing 
markets is an obstacle to migratory inflows in certain regions. Currently (2005), more 
than half the population is living in municipalities with housing shortages. In the 
report, no reference is made to the lack of incentives for municipalities to increase 
their tax base through the construction of new housing or other active policies to 
encourage migratory inflows. In practice, as noted above, some municipalities have 
even faced negative incentives, whereby per capita tax revenue decreases if per capita 
taxable incomes increase.  
A further shortcoming of the Ministry of Industry report is the lack of any 
discussion concerning the long term effect of the composition of production and 
consumption. The authors note that positive developments in employment levels has a 
hampering effect on migration out of a region, but fail to distinguish between positive 
developments in employment levels as a result of a dynamic private sector and 
superficially similar developments resulting from an expanding public sector that, in 
combination with interventionist labour market programs, seeks to compensate for a 
stagnating private sector. From a growth perspective the difference is considerable, but 
apparently this not the main perspective of the report.  
While the report recognizes that small regional wage differentials and a 
compressed wage structure in themselves constitute weakened incentives to 
geographical mobility
54, there is no mention of the manner in which extensive 
redistribution between individuals, and between regions, imply that a large proportion 
of individual consumption stems from the public sector. The consequence of a far-
reaching system for inter-regional redistribution is that a key component of 
individuals’ consumption is no longer affected by individuals’ choice of domicile. 
These factors and their expected contributions to reduced mobility in general and 
reduced migration out of less economically dynamic regions in particular are not 
addressed whatsoever in the report by the Department of Industry.  
                                            
52 An interesting complementary perspective on this is offered by Edling (2005). 
53 SOU 2003:37, p. 15 
54 See for example SOU 2003:37, p. 44 
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sector and a far-reaching system for inter-regional redistribution is generally lacking in 
the report. Not even the effects of reduced mobility on economic growth are discussed 
in a satisfactory manner. Hence the SOU 2003:37 report recognizes a potential conflict 
between regional policy and labour market policy but fails to contribute to our 
understanding of how to solve this conflict. The policy recommendations are evidently 
not primarily intended promote economic growth. Nor do they appear to be founded 
on long-term economic analysis. Rather, the policy recommendations of the report 
come across as bland manifestations of the less-than-instructive slogan “the whole of 
Sweden shall live”.
55 Arguably, such economic policies, through supporting an 
inefficient allocation of labour and impeding the emergence of larger, integrated 
labour markets, might enable ‘the whole of Sweden to live’, but at lower levels of 
income in the future. Notably, there is nothing in the SOU 2003:37 report that 
contradicts the hypothesis discussed above, that extensive inter-regional redistribution 
entails a risk of ‘short-circuiting’ a natural migration process whereby labour is 




“We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But the “man on the 
spot” cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited but intimate knowledge of the 
facts of his immediate surroundings. There still remains the problem of 
communicating to him such further information as he needs to fit his decisions into 
the whole pattern of changes of the larger economic system.” (Hayek, 1945, p. 524-
525) 
 
The quote from Hayek (1945) serves as a reminder that decentralization requires 
communication. This insight remains surprisingly overlooked. Hayek (1945) argues 
that it is the price system that is best suited to serve as the system of communication in 
the economy. While the tax-price of public services offered by municipalities may be 
difficult to quantify with precision, they are nonetheless part of a price system 
affecting individuals’ choice of  domicile. Moreover, if there is such a thing as 
‘natural’ geographical mobility, here taken to mean mobility induced by the search for 
higher productivity and wages, then it seems reasonable to assume that a system for 
inter-regional redistribution that affects the relative tax-price of public services should 
be expected to hamper such mobility. When public goods and services constitute a 
relatively large share of consumption, we should expect this tendency to be 
aggrevated.  
To the extent that structural adjustment entails a geographical reallocation of 
labour, such a causality should be expected to have negative effects on economic 
stability and long-term growth. Political economy problems relating to inter-regional 
redistribution between Swedish municipalities have been given a fair amount of 
attention in recent years. This article argues that political economy considerations do 
                                            
55 This was the slogan of Folkrörelserådet Hela Sverige, an interest group for rural regions, formed in 
1989.  
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discretionary power to the government in allocating transfers between regions. The 
growth perspective on inter-regional redistribution is comparatively neglected. This 
article has sought to show that the long term effects of inter-regional redistribution 
have been largely overlooked. A general conclusion is that the existing studies point to 
an unresolved conflict between labour market policies and regional policies, whereby 
regional policy considerations undermine efforts to promote employment and 
economic growth. Clearly, in order to evaluate the current system for inter-regional 
redistribution we need a better understanding of its effects on labour mobility, by 
implication, on economic growth. In addition, a better understanding is needed of how 
the current system reduces incentives for institutional competition between 
municipalities, which could be expected to result in a lower pace of rationalization as 
well as experimentation and innovation. This in turn results in a less differentiated 
public sector with less ability to cater to individuals’ heterogenous policy preferences. 
This article is primarily intended as a call for further enquiry. The Swedish 
system for inter-regional redistribution is complex and extensive. Without doubt, it 
plays an important role for economic developments in the country. To clarify the 
effects on economic development more exhaustively, paying particular attention to 
dynamic, long-term effects – in the terminology of Pelikan (2004), to attempt a 
comprehensive, evolutionary analysis of this area of economic policy – is a hugely 
important task, and will require a great deal more research. Other aspects of the system 
need to be examined closely, and the assumptions and conclusions of official reports 
should be cross-examined further. Proper political economy analysis, making use of 
developments in economic modeling, could without doubt contribute valuably to the 
understanding of the system. Quantitative analysis of migration data – micro data, 
especially - could contribute significantly to our understanding of the links between 
inter-regional redistribution and geographical mobility. Applications of contemporary 
growth theory might shed more light on the potential effects of the aforementioned 
‘short-circuiting’ of labour mobility, as well as the effects of reduced institutional 
competition, on economic growth and development. Clearly, such research is needed if 
we are to properly evaluate the costs and benefits of the current system of inter-
regional redistribution. It is my hope that this article will at least inspire such further 
research.    
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